LEADER • Four parties holding a majority of the parliament’s seats claim they want Magdalena Andersson as prime minister. Yet, they cannot agree on what government she should lead. This strange parliamentary deadlock not only puts the parties’ willingness to compromise to the test. It also raises the question of how long the Speaker should wait before allowing parliament to do what it was elected to do – make decisions. Andreas Norlén can – and perhaps also should – call for a vote as early as Wednesday.

Sweden has found itself in a parliamentary Catch-22. The Social Democrats, Green Party, Left Party, and Centre Party together command 176 of the Riksdag’s 349 seats. The Tidö parties have 173. On paper, there is thus a majority in favor of a change of government, and all four parties have not only said they want this, but have named Magdalena Andersson as their candidate for prime minister.

The problem is that everyone wants Magdalena Andersson – but not a common government. The Left Party demands to be included. The Centre Party demands that the Left Party not be included. Magdalena Andersson must try to solve an equation in which two of the necessary figures cannot exist at the same time.

The Social Democrat leader has been given and returned the assignment by the Speaker once, received it again, and has now asked for a one-day extension. That deadline expires today, Tuesday. As early as tomorrow, Wednesday, the Riksdag could be forced to take a stand if Andreas Norlén feels the government formation process needs a kick forward, regardless of whether Andersson has a government proposal to present or not.

A Majority That Is Not a Majority

It is tempting to describe the situation as the Left Party blocking a government by demanding ministerial posts. But that is too simplistic. The party has been clear about its demands for letting a government take office long before the election. After having functioned in previous terms as parliamentary support without sitting at the cabinet table, the party does not wish to act as a “doormat” again.

One does not have to sympathize with the Left Party’s policy to understand the logic. A party necessary to form a parliamentary majority can reasonably ask why its mandate should count when the prime minister is chosen, but not when the government is formed.

The Centre Party’s position is equally problematic. Historically a center-right and today in important respects a market-liberal party, the Centre left its previous center-right coalition because it would not accept the Sweden Democrats’ influence. They have every right to do that, of course.

But when C moves to the other side of the bloc divide, a new problem follows. The party simultaneously wants to dictate that one of the parties already there should not participate in government. It is pushy to both switch sides and demand the furniture be rearranged on the new side just to make it comfortable.

Therefore, it is misleading to place blame for the deadlock solely on the Left Party. It is a matter of two incompatible conditions. C says no to the government V demands. V says no to the government C can accept. Magdalena Andersson’s 176 seats thus represent a mathematical majority, but not a political one.

Parliament Chooses a Prime Minister – Not a Government

The Swedish negative parliamentarism makes the situation especially interesting. Parliament does not vote on a government. Instead, it votes on the Speaker’s proposal for prime minister.

To stop Magdalena Andersson, at least 175 members must vote no. She doesn’t need to gather 175 yes–votes; it’s enough that fewer than 175 vote against her. This is significant in the current situation.

The Left and Centre parties, in a prime ministerial vote, do not have to take a position on a government with or without V included, so long as Magdalena Andersson has not yet presented such a solution. First and foremost, they must decide on the person that both parties themselves say they want as prime minister.

This creates a strange situation. If C votes no because it fears V may end up in government, C votes against its own prime ministerial candidate because of a government that does not yet exist. If V does the same because it fears being excluded, V also votes against its own candidate for a government that does not yet exist.

Both positions make political sense. But they expose the difference between what parties say and what their demands genuinely entail. That’s also why a prime ministerial vote can serve a function even before all negotiations are complete. It forces parties to reveal their true colors.

V and C Are Not Playing with the Same Cards

The Centre and Left parties’ tactical situations, however, are not identical. For C, a Social Democrat-led minority government without Left Party ministers may well be acceptable. The party can let Andersson through and then try to influence politics on a case-by-case basis.

For V, the situation is more troubled. If the party first lets Andersson proceed without any guarantees and then is denied participation in government, it will have used up its strongest bargaining chip. It can of course vote against budgets and ultimately help bring a no-confidence motion, but the political threshold for toppling a government in office is significantly higher than for making demands before it takes office.

So, there is a rational explanation for why V is pushing the issue hard now. But that does not change the basic problem. Four parties that together won the parliamentary tug-of-war by a margin of two seats also need to show they can turn this majority into something with which they can govern the country. Being able to count to 176 is not the same as being able to govern.

Norlén Has Seen This Movie Before

For Speaker Andreas Norlén, the situation is both familiar and worse than before. He has experience of government formations that have dragged on with endless rounds of talks, exploratory assignments, and negotiations. The protracted process has also drawn criticism, and ahead of this government formation, Norlén has indicated the process should not have to be as drawn out again.

The problem is that the parliamentary starting point this time hardly makes his work easier. It raises the question of whether the Speaker’s job really is to wait until the parties have solved all their disputes for him.

It is not. The Speaker must seek a candidate for prime minister who can be tolerated by parliament. He must be impartial and, of course, should not use his position to benefit or harm any political side.

But impartiality and passivity are not the same. After a reasonable amount of time, it must be legitimate for the Speaker to conclude that the exploratory phase has reached a dead end and hand the question over to where it ultimately belongs – to parliament’s 349 members.

A Failed Attempt May Be a Good Investment

The objection is obvious. The Speaker does not have unlimited ammunition. If parliament rejects his candidate for prime minister four times, the process must, according to the constitution, proceed to a snap election. Why then “waste” one of the tries on a candidate who not only might but likely will fall?

Because a failed attempt is not necessarily wasted. On the contrary, it may be precisely what is needed to break a deadlock. As long as government formation consists of exploratory talks, all parties can cling to their maximal demands. The cost is limited. One can keep saying that someone else needs to yield.

A concrete vote changes the situation. Suddenly each party must answer to its voters for an actual decision. The Centre Party must explain why it might vote down the prime minister it said it wanted. The Left Party must do the same.

And should Andersson fall, something else will have changed – one of the four chances has been used up. The distance to a snap election gets shorter. This need not be a failure for the Speaker. It can be a way to raise the stakes for continued parliamentary intransigence. After all, the constitution’s four attempts exist to be used, not to never be used at all.

The Speaker Should Not Solve the Parties’ Problems for Them

There is also a more principled question about the Speaker’s role. The longer a government formation continues, the greater the risk that the Speaker is transformed from a constitutional process leader into some kind of chief negotiator for the political system. That is not a desirable development.

Andreas Norlén cannot negotiate away the conflict between the Centre and Left parties. He cannot decide if V should get ministerial posts. He cannot tell C what relationship it should have with V. That is politics. And politics is the parties’ responsibility.

The Speaker’s job is to ensure the constitutional process works. When he judges there have been sufficient efforts to find a solution, he should not be afraid to allow parliament to vote. That stands even if the vote is likely to result in a no.

Sometimes a confirmed failure is more clarifying and acts as more of an icebreaker than yet another week of fruitless behind-the-scenes talks.

A Government Must Also Be Able to Govern

At the same time, there is reason not to make the prime ministerial vote more important than it is. The fact that Magdalena Andersson can be tolerated by parliament does not mean she can also form a functioning government.

The Swedish system is built for minority governments. A government does not need to have its own majority backing it, and it doesn’t need to win every vote.

But it must at least have reasonable chances to pass budgets – even though, in recent times, a government has had to govern on the opposition’s budget – and enough of its own policies for governing to be meaningful.

This is Andersson’s real problem. She could be let through by both C and V and then discover that every conceivable government construction violates some condition of the parties.

This would not be a constitutional crisis. But it could become a political one. It’s important to distinguish between the two. A government can be completely legitimate under the constitution and at the same time be almost impossible to govern with.

The Problem Is Not the Constitution

After yet another complicated government formation, it may be tempting to conclude that the Swedish system does not work. But one should be cautious about that conclusion.

Negative parliamentarism has an important function. It makes it possible to form minority governments in a country where absolute majorities are rare. The alternative – requiring a positive majority for every government – would not necessarily make today’s situation easier.

The constitution can provide the framework for how political conflicts are solved. It cannot force parties to compromise. Four parties say they want Magdalena Andersson as prime minister. Two of them simultaneously demand conditions that cannot be met at the same time.

It is not the constitution that has put them in this situation. They have done it themselves.

Andreas Norlén should give them a reasonable opportunity to solve the problem. But his role cannot be to protect the parties indefinitely from the consequences of their own red lines. Sooner or later the question must leave the Speaker’s office and end up where it belongs. In the chamber of the Riksdag.

There, those who claim to want Magdalena Andersson as prime minister must show if they really mean it.